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The attempts to mitigate the unprecedented health, economic, and social disruptions 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are largely dependent on establishing compliance to 
behavioral guidelines and rules that reduce the risk of infection. Here, by conducting an 
online survey that tested participants’ knowledge about the disease and measured 
demographic, attitudinal, and cognitive variables, we identify predictors of self-reported 
social distancing and hygiene behavior. To investigate the cognitive processes underlying 
health-prevention behavior in the pandemic, we co-opted the dual-process model of 
thinking to measure participants’ propensities for automatic and intuitive thinking vs. 
controlled and reflective thinking. Self-reports of 17 precautionary behaviors, including 
regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing a face mask, served as a dependent 
measure. The results of hierarchical regressions showed that age, risk-taking propensity, 
and concern about the pandemic predicted adoption of precautionary behavior. Variance 
in cognitive processes also predicted precautionary behavior: participants with higher 
scores for controlled thinking (measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test) reported less 
adherence to specific guidelines, as did respondents with a poor understanding of the 
infection and transmission mechanism of the COVID-19 virus. The predictive power of 
this model was comparable to an approach (Theory of Planned Behavior) based on 
attitudes to health behavior. Given these results, we propose the inclusion of measures 
of cognitive reflection and mental model variables in predictive models of compliance, 
and future studies of precautionary behavior to establish how cognitive variables are linked 
with people’s information processing and social norms.
Keywords: COVID-19, cognitive reflection, cognitive failures, risk-taking, infection precaution, planned behavior
INTRODUCTION
Behavioral Measures to Control COVID-19
Countries world-wide are currently considering how to guide and change people’s behavior 
in order to maintain or ease COVID-related measures such as social distancing, increased 
hand washing, self-isolation, etc. These behavioral guidelines and the degree of their uptake 
are important to reduce the spread of the disease, prevent potentially very costly recurring 
waves of infections (Lauerman, 2020), and indeed mitigate likely future epidemics (or pandemics). 
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Although compliance is not uniform, little is known about 
the psychosocial determinants of compliance with COVID 
guidelines (Bogg and Milad, 2020), and the current advice 
provided from scientists to policy-makers is based on general 
principles from pre-pandemic behavioral research (Bavel et al., 
2020). Epidemiologists admit the lack of much-needed 
knowledge about the heterogeneity of behavioral responses 
(Weston et  al., 2018). The famous Imperial College model 
(Ferguson et  al., 2020), which altered the United  Kingdom’s 
strategy, assumed 25% non-compliance on social distancing 
for people aged over 70, apparently without any specific 
empirical basis.
Nevertheless, studies conducted both before (Keizer et  al., 
2019) and during (Xie et  al., 2020) the COVID pandemic 
have shown that various factors influence compliance with 
officially recommended health measures, which in turn should 
increase prevention success, including cognitive ability or 
disposition to pay attention, understand, memorize, or enact 
official guidelines. Thus far, however, no single study has 
investigated a comprehensive range of COVID-related 
precautionary behaviors and their dependence on multiple 
cognitive factors (see Xie et  al. for the effect of working 
memory). It is possible that, when measured at a granular 
level (e.g., use of face masks and tracing apps), other cognitive 
factors may predict compliance with COVID-19-related 
precautionary measures. Consequently, the use of more fine-
grained cognitive-behavioral predictions should enable better 
adherence estimates and allow adjustments of policies and 
guidelines (Anderson et  al., 2020; Webster et  al., 2020).
The current research investigates three specific cognitive 
variables – cognitive failures, cognitive reflection, and thinking 
disposition – and their potential role in precautionary measures 
during the COVID pandemic. These variables – together with 
knowledge about the new disease – were chosen because they 
relate to an important and often referred to theoretical framework, 
the so-called dual-processing theories (see, for reviews, 
Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). The 
dual-processing theories propose that human judgment and 
decision behavior is driven by automatic and unconscious 
mental processes as well as by controlled and reflective thinking. 
While dual-processing theories seek to account for human 
thinking performance, another well-established theory offers 
potential for understanding and predicting COVID-19-related 
behaviors based on attitudinal differences is the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1991).
Theory of Planned Behavior
The TPB has been applied to an extensive range of health-
related behaviors (Armitage and Conner, 2001) and is the 
most influential social cognition model for predicting and 
explaining health behavior. TPB stipulates that a person’s 
behavioral, social, and control beliefs affect the intention for 
behavior change. For example, people who think that one 
cannot transmit the disease in the absence of observable 
symptoms will have behavioral beliefs (“Will this be effective?”), 
social beliefs (“Are others doing it?”), and control beliefs 
(“Am I  able to do this?”), which make it less likely for them 
to adopt prevention measures.
TPB predicts an impressive 30–40% of the variance in 
health (prevention) behaviors (Armitage and Conner, 2001). 
TPB-related variables (attitudes and norms) can in principle 
be  applied to COVID-19-related behavior (Sætrevik, 2020). 
Indeed, recent, but pre-COVID, research found that, in a 
Chinese sample, social norms, perceived behavioral control, 
and attitudes all predicted willingness to socially isolate in 
the face of a pandemic (Zhang et  al., 2019).
Dual-Process Theories of Thinking and 
Decision-Making
TPB notably assumes that attitudes and beliefs about actions 
are explicit, that is, they are given as a considered reflective 
account. However, within cognitive psychology, the dual-process 
theories of thinking and decision-making have become influential. 
They propose the workings in the mind consisting of both 
explicit reasoning and qualitatively different implicit judgment 
processes. The latter “Type 1” processing is thought to be  fast, 
intuitive, and automatic, relying on heuristics (i.e., mental shortcuts) 
or “gut feelings” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974); while the former 
explicit “Type 2” processing is considered to be  slow, reflective, 
and effortful (Evans, 2003, 2010), encompassing logical and 
rational reasoning (Evans, 2008). Thus, unlike Type 2 processing, 
intuitive Type 1 processes are considered to be  not under 
conscious cognitive control (Lowe Bryan and Harter, 1899; Shiffrin 
and Schneider, 1977; Evans, 2008), although the outputs from 
Type 1 thinking may or may not get overturned by conscious 
Type 2 processing (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, 2007). While 
there are some critics of this notion (Gigerenzer and Regier, 
1996; Osman, 2004; Keren and Schul, 2009; Kruglanski and 
Gigerenzer, 2011), the distinction between so-called Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes is supported by considerable empirical evidence 
(Evans, 1977; Evans et  al., 1983; Klauer et  al., 2000; 
Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich et  al., 2019).
A more recent theory of dual-processing proposes a tripartite 
model that specifies two layers responsible for Type 2 processing: 
(1) the “algorithmic mind” and (2) the “reflective mind” 
(Stanovich, 2009). The performance of the algorithmic mind 
can be  specified as the ability to override intuitive Type 1 
responses and to respond with the correct analytical Type 2 
responses (Toplak et al., 2011; see also Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002, 2005). Its operations, therefore, should be  related to 
attentional processes as well as mental simulation abilities 
(being able to separate and manipulate mental representational 
content, Stanovich, 2012). For example, the oft-used Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) presents a small series 
of brief math puzzles. Each of these CRT items evidently 
prompts an intuitively obvious – but incorrect – Type 1 
answer; but, when applying reflective thinking, people are 
more likely to inhibit this first thought and produce the 
correct Type 2 answer by using basic algorithmic thinking. 
The CRT is thought to largely reflect the algorithmic layer 
processing in different ways (Stanovich, 2012): (1) it inhibits 
and overrides Type 1 (autonomous) processes and (2) it 
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generates the correct answers by being able to symbolically 
manipulate representations (for which it needs attentional 
and working memory processing). For our dependent variable 
then, people may need to inhibit the automatic responses 
(i.e., it is easier not washing your hands so often, not wearing 
face masks, and not keeping extra distance). Furthermore, 
people may also need extra attentional and working memory 
processes (to remind oneself to wash one’s hands when 
coming into the house or when having touched surfaces, 
to memorize to stock and then find anti-bacterial gel, etc.). 
In fact, for some people (e.g., of older age), even the operation 
of different types of face masks may require instructions 
and significant efforts (Lee et  al., 2020). Although the CRT 
is thought to be associated with a range of cognitive constructs 
(e.g., Toplak et  al., 2011), including thinking dispositions 
and numeracy (e.g., Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Campitelli 
and Gerrans, 2014), recent evidence shows that working 
memory is the strongest single predictor of CRT performance 
(Stupple et  al., 2017; Gray and Holyoak, 2020).
The reflective mind is the second layer within Type 2 
processes and comprises higher-level cognitive styles, thinking 
dispositions, and metacognitive beliefs (Stanovich, 2011), 
which explain additional variance in thinking performance 
beyond the workings of the algorithmic mind (Stanovich 
and West, 2008; Stanovich, 2012). The reflective mind is 
responsible for the degree to which one thinks extensively 
about problems before responding, the amount of information 
one collects before making decisions, whether one integrates 
others’ points of view into one’s decisions or whether one 
adjusts beliefs according to the quality of the evidence 
(Baron, 2008). High actively open-minded thinking (AOT, 
Stanovich and West, 1998) scores have been shown to have 
a positive correlation with performance in the CRT (Baron 
et  al., 2015) and belief bias syllogistic reasoning tasks 
(Macpherson and Stanovich, 2007). Thus, two people may 
have the same level of cognitive ability, but one may be more 
inclined than the other to engage their algorithmic mind 
because of their disposition to open-mindedly employ reflective 
thinking by taking in new information and be  prepared to 
change their judgments based on it – a property of the 
reflective mind.
Based on the dual-process framework, and, in particular, 
Stanovich’s tripartite model, we  hypothesized that people with 
higher cognitive reflection tendency (AOT) and ability (the 
algorithmic-level processing, measured with CRT) will engage 
more in thinking about, and therefore be more likely to employ, 
precautionary measures than people with lower cognitive 
reflection tendencies. Adopting new tasks, or performing them 
in a new context or with greater frequency (such as remembering 
to wash hands frequently and putting on face masks) should 
tax cognitive resources linked with the algorithmic mind, such 
as inhibition, attention, and working memory capacity 
(Stanovich, 2012). Indeed, cognitive reflection (measured with 
the CRT) has been shown to correlate positively with the 
ability to inhibit impulsive actions (Oechssler et  al., 2009; 
Jimenez et  al., 2018) and recently with causal learning task 
performance (Don et  al., 2016).
In addition, people who perform better on the CRT have 
been found to be  less susceptible to holding paranormal beliefs 
(Pennycook et al., 2012) and less prone to “unusual experiences” 
(generally linked to “jumping to conclusions”; Broyd et  al., 
2019). People with higher CRT scores also perform better at 
distinguishing fake from real news reports (Bronstein et  al., 
2019; Pennycook and Rand, 2019). Accordingly, since individual 
differences in willingness to engage effortful and reflective 
cognitive processes seem to be linked to propensity for irrational 
beliefs, then one can predict that people scoring low on the 
CRT will tend to be  more likely to believe that the COVID-19 
pandemic is a hoax, that risks are exaggerated, or that aspects 
of the guidelines are not to be  believed. Consequently, they 
should be  less likely to engage in precautionary behaviors, 
such as social distancing, wearing face masks, isolating, hand 
washing, etc. Indeed, Xie et  al. (2020) have shown an effect 
of working memory on social distancing behavior – and since 
working memory performance is highly correlated with the 
CRT (e.g., Toplak et  al., 2011; Gray and Holyoak, 2020), these 
data also strongly suggest a link between algorithmic thinking 
and precautionary behavior.
Furthermore, because adopting this range of behavior is 
effortful as one needs to change routines drastically, precautionary 
behavior should be observed more frequently when the underlying 
reasons are clear to the person (Bavel et  al., 2020; Webster 
et  al., 2020). More reflective people with a tendency to open-
minded thinking (AOT) – a higher likelihood to inform 
themselves and adapt their judgments about the pandemic-
related behaviors – are therefore predicted to take in new 
information about the pandemic and follow the official guidelines. 
There may, however, be  a further reason why AOT would 
correlate with the uptake and compliance of precautionary 
behavior. This is the suggestion that people low on AOT scores 
tend to be  politically more conservative, which is in some 
contexts (e.g., in the United  States) associated with skepticism 
in government policies and official guidelines (Price et  al., 
2015; Baron, 2019). Allcott et al. (2020) employed United States 
geo-location data from smart phones and showed that republican-
voting areas engage in less social distancing (controlling for 
other factors, including population density and local COVID 
cases). We therefore predict that people with more conservative 
leanings would score lower on the AOT and potentially also 
be  less willing to adopt precautionary measures. To further 
disentangle cognitive inhibition performance (which the CRT 
measures) and thinking dispositions from general tendencies 
for impulsive behavior, we measure impulsivity and risk-taking 
tendencies separately.
Attention and Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire
Dual-process theories often refer to processes that are demanding 
of attentional and working memory resources when describing 
Type 2 thinking. However, attention and working memory are 
hardly ever tested directly in judgment and decision surveys.
People sometimes make mistakes even with rather mundane 
and familiar tasks, and common everyday failures can be measured 
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by Broadbent’s cognitive failures questionnaire (CFQ; 
Broadbent et  al., 1982, 1986a,b). The CFQ asks people to 
self-rate their propensity for slips of the mind that lead 
them to forget names, faces, or certain tasks. There is good 
evidence that the CFQ correlates with both self-reported 
and independently recorded errors and accidents (Wallace 
et  al., 2003; Wallace and Chen, 2005; van Doorn et  al., 
2010; Day et al., 2012) and is associated with absentmindedness 
(Ishigami and Klein, 2009). Indeed, a recent systematic review 
of how CFQ self-report scores correlate with objective 
measures of executive function domains shows that CFQ is 
mainly associated with performance in selective attention 
(Carrigan and Barkus, 2016), rather than working memory 
or inhibition performance. Following the tripartite model 
of Stanovich (2011) and its explicit mention of attentional 
processes (Stanovich et  al., 2019, p.  1118 and 1123), 
we  included the CFQ as a measure of attentional capacity 
contributing to the algorithmic layer (Type 2) processing 
in addition to the measure of inhibition and simulation 
processes provided by the CRT.
That measuring differences in attention as an additional 
factor for predicting self-reported uptake of precautionary 
measures is reasonable is corroborated by evidence from field 
studies. A recent, but pre-COVID, review found that minimal 
hand-hygiene interventions at workplaces were effective in 
reducing the incidence of employee illness (Zivich et al., 2018). 
Almost all the interventions included in the review that effectively 
increased compliance involved drawing attention to hand washing 
and/or diminishing the load on people’s working memory.
Mental Models
A further factor in predicting health behavior is the degree 
of knowledge and understanding of a disease. A recent review 
found that limited or insufficient health literacy was associated 
with reduced adoption of protective behaviors such as getting 
vaccinated (Castro-Sánchez et  al., 2016). Sax and Clack (2015) 
also reviewed work showing that poor mental models affect 
uptake of hand hygiene in hospitals.
Mental models are representations of the world and its objects, 
the relationships between its various parts, and include perceptions 
about one’s own actions and their consequences. Mental models 
are distinct from mere knowledge or images, as they can contain 
abstract elements (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). Simply 
presenting people with scientific evidence does not mean that 
they fully understand – in a scientific sense – mechanisms of 
transmissions, prevention, and course of a (infectious) disease, 
because people form their own mental models about the biological 
and physical world influenced by their experiences and background 
knowledge. These conceptions often deviate substantially from 
scientific models (Legare and Gelman, 2008; Jee et  al., 2015). 
For example, Sigelman (2012) found that when asked about the 
origins of the common cold, United  States eighth graders 
(13–14  year olds) assigned cold weather explanations greater 
importance than germ-based explanations.
In our study questionnaires measure knowledge of 
COVID-19, asking which symptoms are related to COVID-19 
(compared to common flu), questions probing the quality 
of the mental model of disease (transmission and immunity 
– again, compared to the common flu), prevention behavior 
(past and intended). Our predictions are that greater knowledge 
about COVID-19 symptoms and a better mental model about 
the disease transmission and prevention will correlate with 
better uptake of suggested precautionary measures. The logic 
of the study in terms of cognitive processes is summarized 
in Figure  1.
The Current Study
Our survey measures cognitive variables related to dual-process 
frameworks, risk-taking, the knowledge or mental models people 
have developed about COVID-19, people’s understanding of 
the disease, and how these predict compliance with official 
prevention behaviors (including hand washing, wearing face 
masks, etc.). In addition, demographic (including political 
leanings) and experiential variables (such as media usage during 
the pandemic) were measured.
Following the dual-framework model, we  hypothesize that 
cognitive reflection measures of the algorithmic level (CRT 
and CFQ) will predict uptake of the officially suggested 
COVID-19 prevention measures independently of demographic 
variables (age, sex, and concern about the pandemic) and 
impulsivity-related individual differences (risk-taking and 
behavioral inhibition tendencies). We  also hypothesize that 
the amount of AOT, symptom knowledge and quality of the 
mental model of the disease will predict reported uptake of 
precautionary measures. To provide a baseline for assessing 
the explanatory power of the dual-process model, we  will 
compare results with those from a simplified TPB model 
(which uses measures of different types of beliefs about the 




The study used a cross-sectional quantitative design. Participants 
completed an online survey created using Qualtrics (2018). 
The data were collected on April 28, 2020. The order of questions 
is shown in Table  1. The data were analyzed with R 4.0.1 
(R Core Team, 2020). The full questionnaire, datasets, R code 
and full results including additional analyses are openly accessible 
at the Open Science Foundation.1
Participants
We collected data from 300 participants surveyed online using 
Prolific Academic (female: N  =  206; age: M  =  33.89  years, 
SE  =  0.72; see OSF for a post-hoc bootstrap power analysis). 
Only participants who were currently resident in the 
United  Kingdom and had English as their first language were 
allowed to participate, using Prolific Academic’s pre-screening 
1 https://osf.io/8ahs5/
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database. Participants were paid £2 and completed the 
questionnaire in an average time of 16.41  min (SE  =  0.47). 
Two of the 300 respondents were omitted from the analyses 




Participants’ age, gender, and employment status were identified 
automatically from Prolific Academic’s database. Political leanings 
were assessed with one simple question: “Please choose the 
option that best represents your political views on a 7-point 
scale” from “Strongly left wing” to “Strongly right wing.”
COVID-19-Related Questions
We asked participants whether they were currently staying in 
their main home or somewhere else and whether this was in 
a city or the countryside. Two more brief questions established 
whether they were self-isolating during the last few weeks 
since the start of the pandemic and whether anybody in the 
household had tested positive for the virus. We  also asked 
them questions about how many hours they spent on consuming 
news (traditional via papers, radio and TV, or online) before 
the pandemic and now during the pandemic to generate a 
score reflecting the self-reported change (News.Diff) in news 
consumption (after the pandemic minus before the pandemic). 
Finally, we  asked “How concerned are you  about your own 
personal safety and that of people close to you  in terms of 
the virus?,” measuring respondents’ concern with a 5-point 
Likert scale (from “A great deal” to “not at all”).
Mental Models, Symptoms Knowledge, and 
Prevention Behavior
In order to evaluate participants’ knowledge of symptoms and 
their mental models related to COVID-19, we  asked them 
two sets of questions related to symptoms and attributes of 
COVID-19. These items probed knowledge about the disease 
which was, in the period during and prior to the data collection, 
broadly disseminated by the national and international health 
organizations (Centers for Disease Control, 2020; National 
Health Service United Kingdom, 2020; Public Health England, 
2020; Robert Koch Institute, 2020; World Health Organisation, 
2020a) as well as official news media (Gallagher, 2020). As a 
part of the information about COVID-19 directed to the public, 
the differences between COVID-19 and flu have been highlighted 
(World Health Organisation, 2020b). Our participants were 
asked about symptoms and attributes (mental model) of flu 
in the same set of items which related to COVID-19.
Knowledge of Symptoms
Participants were provided a list of eight disease symptoms 
(fever, shortness of breath, dry cough, headaches, aches and 
pains, sore throat, fatigue, and runny or stuffy nose) and were 
asked to evaluate how frequently they occur in cases of 
COVID-19 and, separately, flu (answer options were “none,” 
“rare,” “sometimes,” and “common”). The correctness of their 
answers was evaluated according to the status of knowledge 
disseminated by media (e.g., CBS News, 2020; Woodward and 
Gal, 2020) and health authorities (Centers for Disease Control, 
2020; National Health Service United Kingdom, 2020; Public 
Health England, 2020; Robert Koch Institute, 2020; World 
Health Organisation, 2020a) in March and April 2020. The 
A B
FIGURE 1 | A tripartite model of thinking processes (A) adapted from Stanovich (2011) and its application in the current study (B).
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symptoms score (S.Diff) was calculated as the difference between 
summed scores. Respondents were scored one point for each 
correct response, zero otherwise. The symptoms score (S.Diff) 
was calculated as the difference between summed scores for 
flu symptoms and COVID-19 symptoms.
Mental Models
In order to understand participants’ mental models of COVID-19 
and flu, we  listed eight statements pertaining to each disease, 
e.g., “there is a vaccine available”2 and “the symptom onset is 
gradual (rather than abrupt)” and asked participants to evaluate 
(yes/no) whether they apply to (a) COVID-19 and (b) flu. 
Again, the mental models score (M.Diff) was calculated as 
the difference between correct sum of scores for correct flu 
statements and the sum of COVID-19 knowledge. As with 
the symptoms above, our rationale was that the difference 
score would be  more informative, assessing how much more 
(or less) people would know about COVID-19 compared to 
the well-known flu.
2 At the time of the study there was no vaccine available for COVID-19.
Prevention Behavior
To measure participants’ self-reported prevention behavior, 
we used a set of 17 items referring to COVID-19 prevention 
measures recommended by the authorities (e.g., “avoid 
touching surfaces in public” and “reduce using public 
transport”). For each of these items, participants reported 
dichotomously (yes/no) whether they (a) “currently do this 
or have recently (in the last two months)” and (b) “plan 
to do this from now on.”
Additionally, participants rated (from 1  =  strongly disagree 
to 5  =  strongly agree; a) perceived effectiveness of prevention 
behavior (“Do you  agree that the actions mentioned above 
are effective?”), (b) its feasibility (“Do you  agree with the 
following statement: ‘It will be  easy to do these actions’”?), 
and (c) its application by significant others (“Do you  agree 
with the statement: ‘In general, people important to you  are 
following these actions’”?)
Two different presentation-orders of these three measures 
were randomly employed in the online questionnaire: (1) 
symptoms knowledge, (2) mental model of the disease, (3) 
prevention behavior and (1) prevention behavior, (2) symptoms 
TABLE 1 | Descriptive results of the measures captured.
Scale Mean (SE) or N
Demographics
 Age Continuous, in years 33.9 (0.73)
 Gender = Female Male and female N = 206
 Employed = Yes Yes (Full time or part time)/No (incl. Student and retired) N = 209
 Politics −3 = Left, 3 = Right-wing −0.59 (0.07)
 Main home = Yes Yes/No N = 289
 Location = City City/Country side N = 213
Covid-19 symptoms
 S.Covid Knowledge of symptoms of Covid-19, max. = 8 items 4.24 (0.09)
 S.Flu Knowledge of symptoms of Flu, max. = 8 items 3.53 (0.08)
 S.Diff Difference of Covid-19 minus Flu, max. = 8 0.71 (0.11)
Covid-19 mental model
 M.Covid Mental model of Covid-18, max. = 8 items 7.45 (0.04)
 M.Flu Mental model of Flu, max. = 8 items 4.86 (0.07)
 M.Diff Difference of Covid-19 minus Flu, max. = 8 2.60 (0.09)
Prevention methods
 P.Not.Now (α = 0.87) Preventive actions not being done, max. = 17 3.82 (0.21)
 P.Effect The actions are effective, −2 to +2 1.55 (0.04)
 P.Follow People are following these actions, −2 to +2 1.51 (0.04)
 P.Easy Ease of the preventive actions, −2 to +2 0.73 (0.06)
Cognitive reflection
 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; α = 0.74) Correct answers, max. = 6 2.38 (0.11)
Actively open-minded thinking (AOT)
 AOT (α = 0.73) Open-minded thinking: 1 = Disagree to 7 = Agree 5.15 (0.04)
Impulsivity and risk-taking
 Risk-Taking Index (RTI; α = 0.76) Risk-taking: 1 = Never to 5 = Very often 1.81 (0.03)
 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; α = 0.78) Impulsiveness: 1 = Never to 4 = Always 2.35 (0.03)
Cognitive failures
 Cognitive failures questionnaire (CFQ; α = 0.88) Cognitive failures: 0 = Never to 6 = Very often 3.25 (0.06)
COVID-related questions
 News.Diff After-before COVID-19 outbreak, in hours 0.57 (0.12)
 Virus concern 1 = Not at all, 5 = A great deal 3.39 (0.06)
 Isolation = Yes Yes/No N = 156
 Positive diagnosis = Yes Yes/No N = 4
A simplified version of each scale used to capture the metrics is shown (see main text body for details). Results are shown either as the mean and standard error (in brackets) for 
continuous and scale measures or as the count (N) for binary measures. For the calculated scales P.Not.Now, CRT, AOT, RTI, BIS, and CFQ, Cronbach’s alphas are shown. Age, 
gender, and employment status were not asked directly but collected automatically from Prolific Academic’s database.
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knowledge, (3) mental model of the disease. There were no 
significant differences between these two conditions consequently 
in further analyses, the data were pooled.
Impulsivity and Risk-Taking
In order to control for the potential moderating effects of 
impulsivity, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) was 
administered (Patton et  al., 1995). In the original version, 
participants respond to 30 items [on a four-point Likert scale 
from 1 (never/rarely) to 4 (almost always/always)]. We  used 
an abbreviated scale of eight items based on the brief version 
of the scale by Steinberg et  al. 2013. A sample item is “I don’t 
pay attention.”
The Risk Propensity Scale or Risk-Taking Index (RTI) 
was designed to assess risk preferences through a short self-
report (Nicholson et  al., 2005). Participants were asked to 
use five-point ratings (from 1  =  never to 5  =  very often) 
for six categories of risks: Recreational, Health, Career, 
Financial, Safety, and Social. These had to be  rated twice: 
one for now and one for in the past, e.g., “We are interested 
in everyday risk-taking. Please could you  tell us if any of 
the following have ever applied to you, now or in your 
adult past? – recreational risks (e.g., rock-climbing and 
scuba diving).”
Cognitive Reflection
The six CRT items were taken from two articles (Frederick, 
2005; Toplak et  al., 2014) excluding the “bat-and-ball” 
problem, due to its now high level of familiarity. A “decoy” 
item consisting of a simple mathematical problem (with 
no “lure” response) was shown as the first item (the “cargo 
ship problem”; Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016), but did 
not contribute to CRT performance score. Respondents 
were asked to enter the correct number using their keyboard. 
Correct responses were scored with 1, while incorrect 
responses were given 0, and so the maximum total 
score was 6.
Sample Item
If it takes five machines 5  min to make five widgets, how 
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
____ min (Correct answer: 5  min and intuitive answer: 
100  min).
Cognitive Failures
The original CFQ consists of 25 items (Broadbent et  al., 1982) 
arranged on a 5-point Likert scale (0  =  never to 4  =  always). 
Possible total scores range from 0 to 100 and Cronbach’s alpha 
for the scale has been found to be  0.90 and above, and it 
has been reported to have a test-retest reliability of 0.82 over 
a 2-month interval (Vom Hofe et  al., 1998). We  used a short 
form of the CFQ by Wassenaar et  al. (2018), which retained 
14 out of the original 25 items.
An example item is “Do you find you  forget whether you’ve 
turned off a light or a fire or locked the door?”
Actively Open-Minded Thinking
AOT questionnaire (Baron, 1993; Haran et  al., 2013) measures 
the willingness to consider new information and remain “open-
minded.” Participants responded to items (e.g., Changing your 
mind is a sign of weakness) on a scale from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
RESULTS
Two participants did not provide their age, so we  omitted 
their data, leaving 298 respondents whose demographics and 
related background are summarized in Table  1.
The Cronbach’s alphas for the main psychological scales 
(AOT = 0.73, RTI = 0.76, BIS = 0.78, CFQ = 0.88, CRT = 0.74, 
and Prevention-Not-Now (P.Not.Now)  =  0.87) ranged from 
acceptable to good (breakdown data for each question are 
available online at https://osf.io/8ahs5/).
We evaluated how well two different models predicted 
the extent of preventive behavior: a dual-process theory 
(DPT) model, and the TPB model. The dependent variable 
(DV) for each model was how many preventive measures 
against infection individuals reported as currently not doing, 
which was measured by the variable P.Not.Now. This is a 
count of “not” or “negative” answers and was coded as 1 
for every “no” answer and 0 for every “yes” answer. The 
variable total score was calculated as the count of the 17 
individual preventive methods and ranged from 0 (providing 
zero “not” answers, i.e., currently doing all the preventive 
methods) to 17 (providing 17 “not” answers, i.e., not currently 
doing any of the preventive methods).
Both models (dual-process, TPB) were evaluated using 
hierarchical regressions, with grouped blocks of independent 
variables being included sequentially. All the independent 
variables used in both models are shown in Table  2, and 
the correlation between them (we excluded potentially 
COVID-related variables that showed no significant 
association with the DV or the modeled predictors, such 
as News.Diff, living at home, political leanings, positive 
test of COVID, and employment situation – see OSF for 
the full correlation analysis).
In both models, we  included demographic predictors 
(including “concern for the virus”) in Block 1 and impulsivity 
and risk-taking indices (BIS and RTI, respectively) in Block 
2. In the dual-process model cognitive variables related to 
algorithmic processing (CFQ and CRT) were tested in Block 
3, and AOT and mental models [symptoms (S) and disease 
(M) – each as difference scores from flu, S.Diff and M.Diff, 
respectively], in Block 4. In the TPB regression, Block 3 
contained the variables relating to beliefs about behavior. 
Table  2 (the last two rows) identifies the variables included 
in each model.
Dual-Process Thinking
We started the analysis with a linear regression model (see 
OSF for additional results). However, P.Not.Now did not follow 
a normal distribution, and the fitted values from the linear 
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model did not reflect the observed data (see OSF for histograms 
of observed and fitted data). In particular, the model did not 
predict any responses at zero (i.e., those with zero “not” answers, 
which equals full compliance with the list of preventive measures). 
This was in fact the most common answer.
Because of this excess (inflation) of answers at zero, and 
P.Not.Now being a count variable, we  proceeded to fit the 
hierarchical model with a Zero-Inflated-Poisson (ZIP) model 
instead. While a standard Poisson model with the same 
average as our observed data would predict very few zero 
observations, the ZIP model attempts to better explain the 
excess observations at zero. It achieves this by using two 
separate processes to predict the final count of “not” answers: 
(1) a Poisson count model and (2) a binomial zero-inflated 
model. The main count model (1), which assumes a Poisson 
distribution, predicts the count of “not” answers (i.e., 0,1,2,3, 
etc.). This model mostly predicts a positive non-zero count 
(i.e., 1,2,3, etc.), with few zeroes; not enough to fit the 
observed data, which had an inflation of answers at zero. 
The excess of observations at zero is predicted by the zero-
inflated model (2), which assumes a binomial distribution. 
This model predicts a binary outcome: it determines the 
probability of an individual answering with zero “not” responses 
or non-zero (i.e., one or more – the actual count is predicted 
by the Poisson count model). According to adjusted R2 and 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the ZIP model fitted 
the data much better than the linear model (see OSF for a 
model fit analysis).
For the dual-process thinking analysis, the independent 
variables were added to the regression in sequential blocks, 
as shown in Table  3. The omnibus test of each additional 
block is also shown in Table 3, with every additional introduction 
of independent variables significant (p  <  0.05).
The results of the models are shown in Table  4. The two 
processes can be  interpreted separately. First, in the zero-
inflated part of the model (which predicts zero or non-zero 
“not” answers), there was a significant effect of age, with 
older participants more likely to provide zero “not” answers 
(i.e., adopting all preventive methods), but no significant 
difference according to gender, in Block 1. More concerned 
participants were also more likely to provide zero “not” 
responses. In Block 4, there was a significant effect of the 
mental models of the virus (M.Diff). M.Diff measures how 
well participants understood the characteristics of the virus 
(compared to their understanding of the common flu virus). 
Participants who were more knowledgeable of the virus were 
more likely to provide zero “not” answers – i.e., adopt all 
preventive behaviors.
Second, in the count part of the model (which predicts 
the count of “not” answers), there was again a significant effect 
of concern in Block 1, with a negative coefficient; participants 
who were more concerned responded with fewer “not” answers 
(i.e., adopted more of the preventive behaviors). In Block 2, 
there was a significant effect of RTI, with more risk-taking 
participants who scored higher on RTI adopting fewer preventive 
behaviors, but no significant effect of BIS. In Block 3, there 
was a significant effect of CRT, with participants who scored 
higher on CRT adopting fewer preventive behaviors. There 
was no significant effect of CFQ. Overall, the observed R2 of 
the model was 0.46.
TABLE 2 | Pearson’s r correlation matrix for the variables used in the two analyses.
Age Gender Concern RTI BIS CFQ CRT AOT S.Diff M.Diff P.Easy P.Effect P.Follow
Age -
Gender −0.04 -
Concern 0.11 −0.15** -
RTI −0.13* 0.23*** −0.07 -
BIS −0.19** −0.03 0.08 0.24*** -
CFQ −0.19*** −0.12* 0.09 0.17** 0.50*** -
CRT 0.07 0.16** −0.10 −0.01 −0.10 −0.08 -
AOT 0.06 0.20*** −0.07 0.01 −0.17** −0.07 0.26*** -
S.Diff 0.11 −0.04 0.03 0.03 −0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 -
M.Diff 0.02 −0.14* 0.12* −0.09 −0.01 −0.01 −0.10 0.00 −0.06 -
P.Easy 0.15** −0.05 0.06 −0.17** −0.06 −0.09 −0.13* −0.10 −0.03 0.06 -
P.Effect −0.03 −0.03 0.20*** −0.14* −0.03 0.03 −0.01 0.06 −0.03 −0.04 0.29*** -
P.Follow −0.01 −0.09 0.14* −0.04 −0.02 0.06 0.02 0.11 −0.05 0.01 0.20*** 0.55*** -
Dual-
process
X X X X X X X X X X - - -
TPB X X X X X - - - - - X X X
The individual variables included in the dual-process and TPB models are identified below the table with an X. NB: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
TABLE 3 | Independent variables included in each sequential stage of the 
dual-process thinking hierarchical regression analysis.
Block Variables Df 2 * ΔLL p
0 Intercept
1 Block 0 + Age + Gender + Concern 6 28.95 <0.001
2 Block 1 + RTI + BIS 4 26.52 <0.001
3 Block 2 + CFQ + CRT 4 18.57 <0.001
4 Block 3 + AOT + S.Diff + M.Diff 6 12.64 0.049
Each sequential block includes the variables from the previous blocks. The table 
shows the improvement in model fit from block to block, measured as twice the 
reduction in log-likelihood (how far away the fitted model is from the original data) in 
each additional stage.
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We also conducted a factor analysis, in order to better 
understand the relationship between the underlying individual 
responses which comprised P.Not.Now. We identified five factors 
based on shared correlations and common themes [(1) social 
distancing, (2) cleanliness, (3) mask usage, (4) sneezing protection, 
and (5) isolation]. We were particularly interested in the unusual 
correlation found with CRT. We  found that the only factor 
which was positively correlated with CRT (i.e., the higher the 
CRT score, the higher the count of “not” answers) was factor 
2 (cleanliness), with a correlation r(297)  =  0.20, p  <  0.001. 
This was confirmed by running the DPT models above on 
the biggest factors, factor 1 (social distancing – CRT is not 
a significant predictor, p  =  0.116) and factor 2 (cleanliness 
– CRT is a significant predictor, p  =  0.005; see OSF for more 
details on the factor analysis).
Theory of Planned Behavior Analysis
We also evaluated a TPB model using a ZIP analysis, with 
the independent variables as shown in Table 5. All the individual 
steps of the analysis led to a significant improvement of model 
fit in comparison to the previous step.
The results of the TPB analysis are shown in Table  6. 
Similarly to the previous model, in among the demographics 
included in Block 1 in the zero-inflated model, there was a 
significant effect of age, with older participants more likely to 
respond with zero “not” answers, but no significant difference 
according to gender. There was also a significant effect of 
concern, with more concerned participants also more likely 
to respond with zero “not” answers.
In the count model, in Block 2, there was also a significant 
effect of RTI, with more risk-taking participants who scored 
higher on RTI adopting fewer preventive behaviors, but no 
significant effect of BIS.
TABLE 4 | Coefficients for the independent variables from each of the dual-process thinking hierarchical regressions.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4










(Intercept) 1.91(0.13) <0.001 1.20(1.21) <0.001 1.00(0.22) <0.001 1.11(0.34) 0.001
Age −0.01(0.00) 0.055 −0.00(0.00) 0.255 −0.00(0.00) 0.202 −0.00(0.00) 0.242
Gender (male) 0.03(0.06) 0.621 −0.03(0.07) 0.618 −0.07(0.07) 0.335 −0.06(0.07) 0.403
Concern −0.06(0.03) 0.045 −0.07(0.03) 0.018 −0.06(0.03) 0.033 −0.07(0.03) 0.028
RTI 0.23(0.06) <0.001 0.22(0.06) <0.001 0.23(0.06) <0.001
BIS 0.11(0.06) 0.061 0.12(0.07) 0.074 0.11(0.07) 0.105
CFQ 0.02(0.03) 0.626 0.02(0.03) 0.628


















(Intercept) −3.85(0.69) <0.001 −2.80(1.11) 0.012 −2.12(1.16) 0.068 −1.02(1.73) 0.555
Age 0.03(0.01) 0.005 0.03(0.01) 0.012 0.03(0.01) 0.020 0.03(0.01) 0.018
Gender (male) −0.20(0.35) 0.561 −0.16(0.36) 0.651 −0.21(0.37) 0.569 −0.02(0.39) 0.966
Concern 0.39(0.15) 0.008 0.39(0.15) 0.008 0.39(0.15) 0.008 0.35(0.15) 0.023
RTI −0.27(0.36) 0.445 −0.22(0.36) 0.544 −0.18(0.37) 0.621
BIS −0.22(0.31) 0.480 0.06(0.35) 0.874 −0.02(0.35) 0.944
CFQ −0.35(0.18) 0.053 −0.36(0.19) 0.061




N 298 298 298 298
Adj. R2 0.263 0.395 0.447 0.465
The dependent variable is always P.Not.Now. Coefficients are log-means for the Poisson model and log-mean of odds-ratios for the binomial model. Coefficients significantly different 
from 0 (with values of p below 0.05) are highlighted in bold. Two participants were excluded due to missing age data.
TABLE 5 | Independent variables included in each sequential stage of the TPB 
hierarchical regression analysis.
Block Variables Df 2 * ΔLL p
0 Intercept
1 Block 0 + Age + Gender + Concern 6 28.95 <0.001
2 Block 1 + RTI + BIS 4 26.52 <0.001
3 Block 2 + P.Easy + P.Effect + P.Follow 6 28.27 <0.001
Each sequential block includes the variables from the previous blocks. The table 
shows the improvement in model fit from block to block, measured as twice the 
reduction in log-likelihood (how far away the fitted model is from the original data) in 
each additional stage.
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In Block 3, there was a significant effect of P.Easy, with participants 
adopting more preventive behaviors when they reported finding 
them easier. There was no significant of the P.Effect (how effective 
the behaviors were rated) or P.Follow (the extent to which their 
friends and relatives were also following the preventive measures). 
Overall, the observed R2 of the model was 0.49.
We then compared the two models according to AIC. The 
TPB model showed a slightly lower AIC (1550) than the DPM 
(1555), but the difference is small. Both models have a much 
better AIC than the linear regression model (see OSF for a 
model comparison analysis). Figure 2 illustrates the correlations 
(for coefficients r  >  0.10) in both regression analyses (DPTM 
and TPB) between predictors and between the predictors and 
criterion (P.NotNow) in a network plot.
DISCUSSION
This online study is the first to our knowledge to test predictions 
from the DPT in the field of judgment and decision-making in 
relation to precautionary behavior in response to, and during, a 
pandemic. We  found that cognitive factors, such as cognitive 
reflection and the quality of mental models (knowledge about 
the disease mechanism), predicted the amount of self-reported 
precautionary behaviors (including hand washing, wearing face 
masks, etc.) and hence compliance with official prevention guidelines.
The results from the first-order correlation analysis and subsequent 
hierarchical regression modeling are relatively clear: demographic 
factors previously associated with health behavior (Pack et  al., 
2001; Deeks et  al., 2009), such as age (but not sex, see Branas-
Garza et  al., 2020 for a similar result regarding COVID-related 
donation behavior) as well as felt concern about the virus, explained 
a significant proportion of the variance on the DV, as did the 
RTI: older participants, respondents who were more concerned 
about the virus, and those self-reporting as less risk-taking in 
normal life, reported greater adherence to precautionary measures.
Interestingly, the cognitive reflection performance as 
measured by the CRT (even after accounting for thinking 
disposition, AOT) and measures of cognitive failures – 
which have not been used in the context of pandemic 
behavior, and hardly at all in the health behavior literature 
in general – correlated with preventive behavior: people 
reporting greater incidences of cognitive failures reported 
less behavioral adherence (although the individual 
contribution of CFQ observed in the first-order correlations 
is not significant anymore in the regression analysis). This 
would be  predicted by standard cognitive theories, based 
on the notion that cognitive failures – as a proxy measure 
of attentional capacity – is linked to working memory 
(Heitz et  al., 2005; Unsworth and Spillers, 2010; Oberauer, 
2019) and hence to performance on tasks relying on such 
executive functions (McCabe et  al., 2010; Xie et  al., 2020).
TABLE 6 | Coefficients for the independent variables from each of the TPB hierarchical regressions.












(Intercept) 1.91(0.13) <0.001 1.20(0.21) <0.001 1.51(0.23) <0.001
Age −0.01(0.00) 0.055 −0.00(0.00) 0.255 −0.00(0.00) 0.187
Gender (male) 0.03(0.06) 0.621 −0.03(0.07) 0.618 −0.03(0.07) 0.678
Concern −0.06(0.03) 0.045 −0.07(0.03) 0.018 −0.05(0.03) 0.127
RTI 0.23(0.06) <0.001 0.18(0.06) 0.002















(Intercept) −3.85(0.69) <0.001 −2.80(1.11) 0.012 −3.31(1.23) 0.007
Age 0.03(0.01) 0.005 0.03(0.01) 0.012 0.03(0.01) 0.014
Gender (male) −0.20(0.35) 0.561 −0.16(0.36) 0.651 −0.21(0.37) 0.573
Concern 0.39(0.15) 0.008 0.39(0.15) 0.008 0.37(0.15) 0.016
RTI −0.27(0.36) 0.445 −0.19(0.37) 0.610




N 298 298 298
Adj. R2 0.263 0.395 0.491
The dependent variable is always P.Not.Now. Results show the log-means for the Poisson model and log of odds-ratios for the Binomial model. Coefficients significantly different 
from 0 (with values of p below 0.05) are highlighted in bold. Two participants were excluded due to missing age data.
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Cognitive reflection performance as measured by the CRT 
uniquely predicted a portion of the variance in precautionary behavior. 
However, counter to our hypothesis, this correlation was negative – 
that is, people scoring lower on the CRT (and presumably leaning 
toward heuristics, fast judgments, and decisions) were more likely 
to engage in the recommended distance and hygiene measures 
to prevent the spread of COVID-19. In line with dual-process 
models as well as general conceptions about relevant health behavior 
tested in a pandemic (e.g., Bavel et  al., 2020), we  expected more 
reflective individuals to be more compliant, as, for them, the need 
for engaging in such demanding tasks – involving working memory 
and prospective memory (Xie et  al., 2020) – should be  easier to 
understand, plan, and adhere to. We  discuss further possible 
explanations for this surprising finding below.
Finally, AOT and knowledge about the symptoms of the 
new disease did not predict reported behavior. AOT did, however, 
correlate positively with CRT – meaning that actively open-
minded people are more prone to cognitive reflection, which 
is of course in line with the tripartite model (Stanovich, 2011).
TPB and Cognition
The results of the current study show that TPB as a model 
of health-related behavior also predicted the uptake and 
maintenance of current precautionary behaviors at the first 
height of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, of the three 
behavioral attitudes only the variable of perceived behavioral 
control (the item measuring how easy it was to follow the 
behavioral advice) was a significant predictor (although the 
three attitudinal variables correlated with another). It is likely 
that, in this current pandemic, subjective norms were already 
at ceiling and that the vast majority was following the guidelines 
(early indications point to 83% compliance in the 
United Kingdom, Weinberg, 2020). Moreover, behavior compliance 
was relatively enforced (police checks on unnecessary travel) 
and alternative behavioral opportunities were already heavily 
curtailed (work places, entertainment venues, shops etc., closed).
Finally, it should be  acknowledged that our TPB model was 
highly simplified, measuring behavioral attitudes with only three 
questions (perceived control, social norms, and effectiveness). 
Nevertheless, TPB predicted a substantial proportion of variance 
in precautionary behavior, explaining a similar amount of variance 
than the dual-process model.
Explanations for CRT Correlation
Against our expectations, the correlation between CRT scores 
and avoidance of precautionary behavior was positive (i.e., the 
correlation between CRT and P.Not.Now was positive, with higher 
CRT scores correlated to more “not” answers to precautionary 
actions); more reflective people adopted fewer preventive behaviors. 
Our original expectation was based on the general notion that 
the tasks in the heuristics and biases literature are deliberately 
constructed to induce a heuristically triggered response, which 
needs to be  overridden by a normative response generated by 
the analytic system. According to Stanovich’s concept of “cognitive 
decoupling,” the CRT measures the ability to inhibit automatic 
responses and simulate alternative responses (Stanovich, 2011). 
Our premise was that this ability would be  needed if people 
were to adhere to precautionary measures, as they would need 
to override automatic responses, such as relying on their previous 
default behavior (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003) and in addition 
use mental simulation to employ the correct measures at the 
correct time, in the correct order. Similar reasoning has been 
invoked to explain why high CRT scorers are less likely to believe 
in conspiracy theories and fake news (Pennycook and Rand, 2019).
FIGURE 2 | Visual representation of the correlations between the DV and all the IVs in both models (dual-process theory, DPT and Theory of Planned Behavior, 
TPB), similar to a network plot. Only correlations greater than 0.1 are plotted. Black lines indicate positive correlations and red lines indicate negative correlations. 
The darkness and thickness of the lines represent the strength of the correlation. The spatial location and proximity of the variables are determined by classical 
multidimensional scaling based on the absolute values of the correlations.
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Concerning other correlations with the CRT, previous 
work has also reported effects of gender (Frederick, 2005; 
Campitelli and Gerrans, 2014; Thomson and Oppenheimer, 
2016; Branas-Garza et  al., 2020) using the classic three-item 
version, with male participants usually outperforming females. 
One reason given for this observation is that males have 
higher numeracy (Baron et  al., 2015), though Campitelli 
and Gerrans cite both numeracy and rational thinking ability, 
whereas others think the difference could be  due to higher 
anxiety or lower self-assessment on numerical aptitude (e.g., 
Zhang et  al., 2016). Note that we  omitted the notorious 
“bat-and-ball” question from the classic three-item test, which 
may have contributed significantly to the previously reported 
association with numeracy (Sinayev and Peters, 2015) and 
added four items from Toplak et  al. (2014), which arguably 
are less reliant on numeracy. Less frequently reported are 
associations with age, with some authors finding no correlation 
(Campitelli and Gerrans, 2014; Thoma et  al., 2015).
According to Baron (2017), the CRT is largely a measure 
of reflection/impulsivity: the willingness to take more time in 
order to be  more accurate on judgment tasks, and CRT scores 
should therefore correlate with other normative responses. 
Clearly, this was not the case here for our type of responses, 
precautionary measures. Some commentators see the dual-system 
approach as only valid in well-structured environments such 
as psychological laboratory settings (Dane and Pratt, 2007; 
Hogarth, 2010; Magnusson et  al., 2014). A similar argument 
is made by Risen (2016) who argues that Type 2 processing 
can be  indeed differentiated as error detection and correction 
but adds the notion that error correction does not necessarily 
follow when an error is detected – and hence “acquiescence” 
is a possible System 2 response. This arguably explains why 
even “smart” people believe in magical thinking and superstition.
But although this approach may explain why we  did not 
find a negative correlation between CRT and P.Not.Now, it 
does not explain why we still see a significant positive correlation 
between CRT and P.Not.Now. It is generally assumed that the 
CRT measures heuristic processing, and heuristics are thought 
to work through “attribute substitution”: when asked to answer 
a hard question (i.e., make numerical judgments) people substitute 
it with an easier one (e.g., “how easy does the answer come 
to mind?”; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), which causes 
judgment biases. Able individuals’ Type 2 processing – measured 
with the CRT – will however, intervene and stop this substitution 
of a hard-to-evaluate characteristic for an easy one and usually 
improve judgment performance. However, according to West 
et  al. (2012), when it comes to judgments about risks, Type 2 
processing may do the opposite: “For example, people will 
substitute the less effortful attributes of vividness or salience 
for the more effortful retrieval of relevant facts. But when 
we  are evaluating important risks—such as the risk of certain 
activities and environments for our children—we do not want 
to substitute vividness for careful thought about the situation. 
In such situations, we want to employ Type 2 override processing 
to block the attribute substitution.” (p.  508).
A different possible explanation could be  that people with 
high CRT score thought more than others about the different 
guidelines and associated behavior, and in turn queried them 
critically to the point of higher non-adherence. For example, 
there is evidence that during an Ebola epidemic health 
professionals in quarantined villages were less likely to adhere 
to the quarantine than (presumably less knowledgeable) 
volunteers (see Webster et al., 2020). We originally hypothesized 
that the (perceived) effort of compliance with precautions would 
make less reflective people reluctant to adopt precautionary 
measures. However, conceivably, the effort of compliance may 
also spur the more reflective to think of reasons to override 
the prescribed behaviors; following precautionary guidelines, 
while effortful, may be  cognitively simpler than generating 
reasons to dissent. If so then, accordingly, the non-compliant 
might conceivably be  a mixture of two types: thoughtless 
recalcitrants (low on CRT) and thoughtful sceptics (high on 
CRT). The blend of each – and so the observed relationship 
between CRT and compliance – may depend on such things 
as the strength of social norms to comply (including how 
consistently experts endorse the measures) and how many other 
like-minded and/or critical people one is proximal to.
So could one have predicted these results if one assumes 
that irrational behavior (as measured by the CRT) depends 
on the perceived rationality or irrationality of the suggested 
measures by policy-makers and governments (for example, if 
people thought the measures were too drastic or even 
counterproductive then may be  the positive CRT correlations 
express rational thinking)? Given that the data were collected 
at the height of the pandemic’s first wave (not only in the 
United  Kingdom but also across Europe) and the measures 
(i.e., behavioral guidelines) we  asked about apparently had a 
drastic effect in reducing infections, we think we rightly assumed 
that rational thinking and precautionary behavior were indeed 
linked at that time (in the first wave). Compliance in the 
population was very high then, and of course hygiene measures 
are widely accepted to be  effective (although we  now know 
that social distancing is even more important). Also, during 
the pandemic’s first wave many people have died, a strong 
argument for the rationality of these behavioral measures. 
Finally, the variable measuring concern did correlate positively 
with uptake of these measures.
Yet another possible explanation for the positive correlation 
between CRT and P.Not.Now is the negative association 
between CRT and prosocial acting. According to the recent 
study by Campos-Mercade et al. (2021), prosociality predicted 
health behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic. According 
to Capraro et  al. (2017), intuition is connected with concern 
for relative shares (which could be  not only egalitarian but 
also spiteful), whereas deliberation is associated with 
individuals’ focus on social efficiency. In the context of 
economic games (e.g., the dictator game, the ultimatum game, 
and the prisoner’s dilemma), it was found that high cognitive 
reasoning and intelligence are negatively associated with 
cooperation and prosociality (Yamagishi et  al., 2014) 
particularly in situations when the participants’ lack of 
cooperation did not have any negative consequences for them 
such as in one-shot games (Barreda-Tarrazona et  al., 2017; 
Inaba et  al., 2018). This association disappears in situations 
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when cooperation has no or very low cost for the individual 
(Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara, 2015; Corgnet et  al., 2016).
Based on these findings, prosociality was proposed to 
be  connected with intuitive processes and the findings led to 
the social heuristics’ hypothesis, according to which intuition 
increases prosociality for people used to cooperative interactions 
(Rand et  al., 2014; but see Chen et  al., 2013; Verkoeijen and 
Bouwmeester, 2014). Clearly there is a need for further research 
to disentangle the significance of CRT scores from other 
psychological variables and contextual effects.
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
The CFQ correlated negatively with precautionary behavior, 
in the first-order correlations, although there was not a unique 
contribution of cognitive failures in the regression model. 
CFQ scores are related in the literature to variables, such as 
selective attention, multi-tasking, worry, stress, and boredom 
(Robertson et  al., 1997; Wallace et  al., 2003; Linden et  al., 
2005) – all factors that can be  expected to play a major role 
in a lockdown situation in which many of the respondents 
will have found themselves in the United Kingdom. The main 
reason for including the CFQ was to enable us to disentangle 
cognitive reflection (CRT: cognitive inhibition and mental 
stimulation) from other cognitive processes (e.g., selective 
attention). Therefore, we cannot currently pinpoint a potential 
link between cognitive failures and precautionary behavior 
but given its association with a range of psychological factors, 
further research should be  conducted to elucidate its role in 
preventative behavior.
Mental Models
Knowledge of COVID-19 symptoms (S.Diff – comparing with 
knowledge of common flu symptoms) did not predict uptake 
of prevention behavior; however, the quality of the mental 
model around disease transmission and infection (M.Diff) 
did – similar to what was found, for example, for hospital 
staff (Sax and Clack, 2015). Regarding the lack of effects 
from symptoms knowledge, one possible reason could be  a 
floor effect (median for P.Not.Now was 3, meaning that 
participants were doing 82% of all the possible actions) and 
that people were already well-informed at the height of the 
pandemic. Indeed, we  did not find a correlation between 
P.Not.Now and additional (since the pandemic) news 
consumption r(298)  =  −0.02, p  =  0.73. Future research will 
need to address the cause-and-effect relationship between 
cognitive reflection, mental models, and preventative behavior, 
but our results make it clear that the quality of information 
and their uptake by the population have a significant effect 
on compliance.
Strengths and Limitations
Although based on theory, this study was necessarily exploratory 
to some degree, simply because of the novel nature of human 
actions it was investigating: the first global pandemic for 
100  years. There are a number of variables that may have 
shed more light on our findings, e.g., perceived behavioral 
barriers (influences that discourage adoption of the behavior); 
also including an explicit measure self-efficacy (as often used 
within TPB) and measures of altruistic tendencies could help 
to find explanations for the patterns observed here. Nevertheless, 
the current research has some significance and originality, as 
it combines variables from two major theoretical strands of 
health-related research, the dual-process framework and TPB 
and demonstrates how these theoretical ideas could help to 
predict precautionary behaviors, and by extension, save human 
lives in future.
A further limitation is that we  have not included further 
cognitive control variables – such as numeracy or math skills, 
which may explain part of the variance in CRT (e.g., Cokely 
and Kelley, 2009) – to better disentangle the analytic processes 
associated with predicting precautionary behavior. Furthermore, 
other variables could have made a contribution to the behavioral 
scores such as level of education. Another limitation is of 
course the time frame, as we  could not trace changes in 
perceptions and actions over time during the COVID-19 crisis. 
Our survey captured the United  Kingdom respondents at the 
height of the first lockdown (end of April 2020), only after 
which (from May to June 2020) there was an easing of both 
the pandemic and behavioral guidelines in the United Kingdom. 
It is possible that certain correlations between cognitive factors 
and precautionary behavior may be  dependent on the length 
of time in which the measures have been already implemented. 
For example, it is possible that there would be  a negative – 
instead of the observed positive – correlation between CRT 
and P.Not.Now in the early days of lockdown, when more 
reflective individuals may have assessed the situation as graver 
than the non-reflective.
Conclusions
In a recent Nature Human Behavior perspective article 
(Bavel et al., 2020) by over forty behavioral scientists reviewing 
how insights from the social and behavioral sciences can be used 
to help align human behavior with the recommendations of 
epidemiologists and public health experts, the authors stressed 
the need for prosocial messages: e.g., “Leaders and the media 
might try to promote cooperative behavior by emphasizing 
that cooperating is the right thing to do and that other people 
are already cooperating.:…” Messages that (i) emphasize benefits 
to the recipient, (ii) focus on protecting others, (iii) align with 
the recipient’s moral values, (iv) appeal to social consensus or 
scientific norms, and/or (v) highlight the prospect of social 
group approval tend to be  persuasive.” However, these authors 
did not mention cognitive reflection (or any other cognitive 
variables) as relevant factors.
In conclusion, our results demonstrate that individual 
differences in general cognitive abilities (cognitive reflection) 
and knowledge about the disease (mechanisms about transmission 
and infectiousness, but not knowledge about symptoms) are 
significant predictors for behavioral adherence to precautionary 
behavior in a pandemic, beyond known factors such as age 
or risk-taking. These variables appear to be  as or even more 
predictive than differences in impulsivity, people’s political views, 
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or where they live (town vs. country). This finding promises 
to close a gap in understanding compliance with precautionary 
behavior left by social norms approaches such as TPB.
People were more likely to adhere to official guidelines 
during the extraordinary COVID-19 pandemic when they 
were, in general, less reflective in their judgment and decision-
making style, possibly due to them following heuristics or 
simple rules as this was an easier cause of action, they overly 
criticized the rationality of the guidelines or because they 
were following social norms. At the same time respondents 
were also more likely to follow these guidelines when they 
had a better understanding of the infection mechanism. Future 
research on cognitive factors in health-prevention behaviors 
should better establish how cognitive variables are linked 
with people’s information processing and social norms in 
order to improve predictions of precautionary behavior.
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